Doc 9691. Издание 3. Amendment No. 1 29/6/18

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Doc 9691. Издание 3

Amendment No. 1 29/6/18

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Doc 9691-AN/954 Amendment No. 1 29/6/18 MANUAL ON VOLCANIC ASH, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND TOXIC CHEMICAL CLOUDS Third edition AMENDMENT NO. 1 1. Replace existing pages with the attached new pages dated 29/6/18 a Pages vi and vii Foreword b Pages xiii and xiv Glossary c Page I-i-2 Part I, Introduction d Pages I-3-13, I-3-19 and I-3-20 Part I, Chapter 3 e Pages I-5-5 to I-5-9, I-5-11 to I-5-17 Part I, Chapter 5 f Pages I-6-1 to I-6-3, I-6-6, I-6-8, and Part I, Chapter 6 I-6-11 g Page II-1-2 Part II, Chapter 1 h Pages II-3-1, II-3-2, II-3-5 and II-3-6 Part II, Chapter 3 i Pages App H-1 and App H-2 Appendix H 2. Record the entry of this Amendment on page ii.

v FOREWORD On 24 June 1982, the aviation community and much of the world learned of the drama involving a British Airways B747 aircraft which lost power on all four engines while flying at 11 300 m 37 000 ft from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to Perth, Australia. During the ensuing sixteen minutes, the aircraft descended without power from 11 300 m to 3 650 m 37 000 ft to 12 000 ft, at which point the pilot was able to restart three of the engines and make a successful emergency landing at Jakarta, Indonesia. Over the next few days the civil aviation authorities, engine manufacturers and the airline company involved mounted an urgent investigation into the cause of the four-engine flame-out. On-site inspection of the airframe and engines revealed a general sand-blasted appearance to the leading edges of the wing and engine inlet surfaces, the radome and the cockpit windows. Borescope inspection of the engines revealed no apparent mechanical damage and no fuel problem, but heavy deposits of an unknown material were found on the concave surfaces of the high-pressure turbine and nozzle guide vanes. The report of the incident by the pilot indicated that an acrid electrical smell had been noticed in the cockpit at the time and what appeared to be very fine dust or smoke entered the cockpit. St. Elmos fire was observed on the leading edge of the engine nacelles and around the cockpit windows, and a search light effect was visible shining out of the engines through the fan blades. Moreover, when the aircraft was making its emergency landing at Jakarta, it was immediately apparent that the cockpit windows were almost completely opaque and the landing had to be completed by the pilot looking through a small side- section of the cockpit window that had remained relatively clear. Piecing together the available evidence and knowing that a large Indonesian volcano, Mt. Galunggung, had been erupting at the time of the incident, suspicion quickly focused on a volcanic ash cloud as being the likely culprit. This suspicion gained further support some three weeks later when another aircraft, a B747 of Singapore Airways bound for Melbourne, Australia, reported a similar incident. This time power was lost on two engines and the aircraft also diverted successfully to Jakarta. Subsequent strip-down inspection of the engines from the British Airways aircraft revealed general evidence of sand-blasting, erosion of compressor rotor paths and rotor blade tips, erosion of the leading edges of high-pressure rotor blades and fused volcanic debris on the high-pressure nozzle guide vanes and turbine blades. It was clear that the engines on the aircraft had all stalled due to ingestion of volcanic ash and that a restart had only been achieved because the aircraft, in descending without power, happened to fly out of the high-level volcanic ash cloud into clear air. The seriousness of these two incidents was not lost on the aviation community. While it was known that aircraft had encountered difficulties in the past when inadvertently flying through volcanic ash cloud, these incidents had generally been restricted to the sand-blasting effect of the ash on cockpit windows and to blocked pitot-static tubes. It was now perfectly clear to all that such ash clouds had the potential to cause a major aircraft accident. To meet this newly recognized threat, the ICAO Air Navigation Commission moved swiftly to develop a set of interim guidelines to assist States in the dissemination of information on volcanic ash to pilots and the development of contingency arrangements for the diversion of aircraft around affected areas, pending the development of the necessary formal amendments to the relevant Annexes to the Chicago Convention and Procedures for Air Navigation Services PANS. These formal amendments were subsequently developed, with the assistance of the ICAO Volcanic Ash Warnings Study Group VAWSG, and were adopted by the ICAO Council in March 1987.

Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material vi and Toxic Chemical Clouds The initial amendments to the ICAO Annexes and PANS comprised international Standards, Recommended Practices and Procedures covering the observation and reporting of volcanic activity, eruptions and ash cloud, the issuance to aircraft of warnings and, as necessary, information regarding the closure of air routes and the activation of alternative contingency routes, and the reporting by pilots to air traffic service units of any observed volcanic activity or encounter with volcanic ash cloud. These initial provisions essentially formed the framework for the ICAO International Airways Volcano Watch IAVW, the establishment of which was made possible by the cooperation of States and a number of international organizations. In addition, the need to develop guidance material on volcanic ash in the form of an ICAO circular was identified by the Air Navigation Commission. During the next few years, however, events moved faster than anticipated with a number of explosive eruptions occurring including Mt. Redoubt and Mt. Spurr in Alaska in 1989 and 1992, respectively, Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines and Mt. Hudson in Chile in 1991, all of which affected aviation. The experience gained in conducting aircraft operations during these and other eruptions permitted the development of detailed regional procedures to cope with the situations. In view of this, the Air Navigation Commission agreed that the guidance material on volcanic ash should be issued as an ICAO manual and not as a circular. Further amendments to the ICAO Annexes and PANS were made to provide for the issuance by meteorological watch offices MWOs of information concerning en-route weather and other phenomena in the atmosphere that may affect the safety of aircraft operations SIGMETs encountering a volcanic ash cloud, to assist operators at the flight planning stage in the dispatch of aircraft on long-haul routes and to include provisions relating to Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres VAACs. In this regard, international arrangements were made, in cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization WMO, to designate nine regional volcanic ash advisory centres having the capability to detect, track and forecast the movement of volcanic ash clouds and provide advice to meteorological watch offices in their areas of responsibility. The role and responsibilities of the VAACs were introduced into Annex 3 by Amendment 71 which became applicable on 5 November 1998. Since the eruptions of Mt. Galunggung in Indonesia in 1982 there have been numerous explosive volcanic eruptions around the world, many of which have affected aircraft operations. With the occurrence of each new eruption, the opportunity has been taken to focus on and review the local and international arrangements for the issuance of information to pilots and, where necessary, fine-tune these arrangements based on actual operational experience gained in dealing with the impact of the eruptions on aircraft operations. In this way, the IAVW is being steadily expanded and strengthened. There have been many difficulties faced in the establishment of the IAVW, most of which have been of a technical or procedural nature which, with the cooperation of States and international organizations, have since been resolved. There is, however, a more general difficulty that is unlikely to ever be eliminated completely and which, therefore, requires constant attention. This concerns the fact that the IAVW depends entirely on cooperation between a number of different disciplines such as air traffic services, communications, meteorology and vulcanology and numerous and varied national observing sources such as forestry stations, customs/immigration border posts, etc., within sight of active volcanoes. Constant attention is required by States to maintain effective communications channels from the various observing sources to the relevant area control centres ACCs/flight information centres FICs and MWOs. Moreover, because explosive volcanic eruptions in any one State are, thankfully, comparatively rare events, maintaining the currency of the local procedures during numerous staff changes and over long periods when the procedures may never have had to be activated under the circumstances of a real volcanic eruption in a particular State, is extremely difficult. In addition to its potential to cause a major aircraft accident, the economic cost of volcanic ash to international civil aviation is staggering. This involves numerous complete engine changes, engine overhauls, airframe refurbishing, window re-polishing and/or replacement and pitot-static system repair, etc., and the inevitable loss of revenue due to aircraft down-time while the foregoing is accomplished. Delays to aircraft and their rerouting around volcanic ash has caused considerable expense to airlines operating in regions prone to volcanic eruptions. Also to be included is the cost of volcanic ash clearance from airports and the damage caused to equipment and buildings on the ground. Various estimates have been made, most citing costs to aviation well in excess of 250 million since 1982. 29/6/18 No. 1

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